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A Defendant Must Prove That Mental Retardation Existed Before the
Age of Eighteen in Order to Be Protected From the Death Penalty:
Commonwealth v. Vandivner
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF MENTALLY
RETARDED-PENNSYLVANIA - The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the death
sentence of mentally deficient appellant because appellant failed to prove mental retardation
existed before he was eighteen years old.
Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 962 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2009).
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THE VANDIVNER DECISION

On July 5, 2004, some time between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., appellant James W. Vandivner
("Vandivner") entered the home of Michelle Cable ("Cable") through the back door.' As
Vandivner walked through the house, he came upon Larry Newman ("Newman"), a family
friend.2 When Vandivner asked Newman where Cable was, Newman pointed towards the front
door.3 Vandivner opened the door and walked into the sun porch.4 On the outside steps leading
to the porch, Vandivner encountered Cable and her son, Billy Cable ("Billy").5 When Vandivner
pointed the gun at Cable, Billy quickly jumped on him and attempted to disarm him. 6 Vandivner
was able to keep control of the gun and pointed it at Newman's head,7 then quickly approached
Cable with his gun in hand and verbally threatened to kill her. 8 He pulled Cable by her hair and
shot her in the head. 9 Vandivner then shot Billy in the neck and fled the scene.' 0 Vandivner
was charged with first-degree murder, criminal attempt to commit criminal homicide, and
aggravated assault.
Before his trial, Vandivner filed a petition to bar the death penalty, arguing that he was
mentally retarded and that his adaptive skills were significantly limited. 12 He contended he was
Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 962 A.2d 1170,1173 (Pa. 2009).
daughter, Jessica Cable. Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1173.
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Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1173.
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Id. at 1174.
Id. As Cable fell to the ground, Vandivner said, "[t]here, you bitch, I said I was going to kill you."
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Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1174.
Id. at 1174.
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protected under the rule established in Atkins v. Virginia,13 such that the execution of mentally
retarded defendants constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.14 The trial court conducted a fourday hearing to determine whether the death penalty violated Vandivner's constitutional right to
protection from cruel and unusual punishment.' 5 At the hearing, the defendant presented the
testimony of two expert and several lay witnesses, and the Commonwealth offered the testimony
of a psychiatrist, as well as a Pennsylvania Department of Transportation official.16
The trial court ruled that Vandivner failed to meet his burden of proof such that his
alleged mental retardation existed before he reached the age of eighteen, required in order for a
mentally retarded defendant to avoid the death penalty pursuant to Commonwealth v. Miller.17
Consequently, Vandivner's petition was denied. 18 Following a jury trial, the defendant was
found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.19 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania granted his direct appeal.2 0
On appeal, Vandivner raised eight issues; three concerned his petition to prohibit a
sentence of death. 2 1 First, Vandivner contended the trial court erred in determining that
Vandivner failed to satisfy each part of the three-prong test adopted in Miller.22 There, the court
held that in order for a defendant to be deemed mentally retarded, he must show (1) he possesses
limited intellectual functioning; (2) his conceptual, social, and practical skills are significantly
limited; and (3) the age of onset was before age eighteen. 23
Second, Vandivner argued the trial court erred in refusing to allow the testimony of a
mental retardation expert during his hearing. 24 Vandivner contended that because such an expert
never testified, the trial court did not have any basis for determining whether Vandivner's
adaptive abilities were similar to those of a mildly mentally retarded person. 2 5
Finally, Vandivner contended that because he was mentally deficient to the same degree
as a defendant labeled as mentally retarded, he cannot be executed under the Atkins rule.2 6 He
argued that regardless of when his mental limitations began, he should be ineligible for capital
punishment because such punishment would violate his constitutional protection under the

536 U.S. 304 (2002). In Atkins, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Virginia Supreme
Court's death sentence of appellant on the grounds that the execution of mentally retarded criminals constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 321.
14
Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1174.
15
Id.
1.
Id. Vandivner, when not incarcerated, maintained employment as a commercial truck driver. Id.
at 1184.
17
888 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2005).
18
Id. at 1174.
19.
Id. at 1175. Additionally, the trial court imposed a consecutive sentence of twenty to forty years
for the attempted murder of Billy Cable and ten to twenty years for the aggravated assault of Larry Newman. Id.
20
Id. at 1173.
21
Id. at 1175.
22
Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1183.
23
Id. (citing Miller, 888 A.2d at 631). In Miller, the court stated that "significant limitations in
adoptive behavior are operationally defined as performance that is at least two standard deviations below the mean
of either (a) one of the following three types of adaptive behavior: conceptual, social, or practical, or (b) an overall
score on a standardized measure of conceptual, social, and practical skills." Miller, 888 A.2d at 630-31.
24
Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1188.
13
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Eighth Amendment. 27
Chief Justice Castille delivered the opinion of the majority. 28 The court determined
Vandivner failed to establish that the onset of his alleged mental retardation occurred before he
reached age eighteen, and therefore, he could not claim ineligibility for the death penalty on such
2
30
a basis.2 9 The court found no error in the trial court's analysis or conclusions on this issue.
In Miller, the court had held that a defendant may establish mental retardation using
either the standard set by the American Association of Mental Retardation or the one set forth by
the American Psychiatric Association. 3 1 Chief Justice Castille noted that these standards share
three elements: limited intellectual functioning, significant adaptive limitations, and age of
onset. 32
The court reasoned that Vandivner failed to produce IQ tests from his childhood, and his
high school records did not prove that he had been placed in special education classes because of
mental retardation. 33 The majority agreed with the trial court that such a placement could have
resulted from behavioral problems, rather than from mental retardation, and Vandivner's
excessive absences could have been the main reason for his unsatisfactory academic performance
overall.34 Furthermore, the court stated that the purpose of the "age of onset" requirement was to
prevent defendants from imitating mental retardation after they are charged with capital crimes. 35
Chief Justice Castille expressed particular concern regarding this issue, noting the
Commonwealth's psychiatric expert, Dr. Wright, testified that Vandivner gave a poor effort on
the tests he had administered.36
Regarding the second issue, the court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to appoint an additional expert to provide testimony. 37 The majority stated that any
additional testimony concerning Vandivner's mental condition would have been cumulative. 38
Chief Justice Castille recognized that the decision to allow or disallow an expert witness is an
evidentiary determination of the trial court and will not be disturbed, absent a clear abuse of
discretion. 39 The court stated that because Vandivner's psychological expert, Adam Sedlock,
and Dr. Bernstein testified extensively as to their opinions of Vandivner's limited adaptive skills,
any additional expert testimony on the defendant's behalf would have been cumulative. 40 The
majority then stated that Vandivner was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to appoint the
expert because the controlling factor was Vandivner's failure to establish the onset of mental
retardation by age eighteen, which was unrelated to his adult adaptive behaviors.41
27
Id. at 1189. The Eighth Amendment provides "Excessive bail shall not be required... nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. CONST. amend. VIll.
28
Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1173.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 1188.
31
Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1186.
32
33

Id

.Id

d

.4
Id A school official offered testimony that Vandivner, during his tenth grade year, missed
ninety-two days of school. Id. at 1185.
35.
Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1187.
36
Id.at1188.
37

I at 1189.

38

39

Idat 1188.

40

Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1188.
Id at 1188-89.

41
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Finally, Chief Justice Castille stated that because there was no prohibition on imposing a
death sentence on a defendant who is mentally deficient rather than mentally retarded,
Vandivner's claim that his death sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment must fail. 42
The majority argued that because the United States Supreme Court did not establish a national
standard for mental retardation, there was a certain amount of flexibility permitted under the
Atkins rule.43 Here, Vandivner failed to offer any case law for barring the execution of
defendants who were mentally deficient but did not meet the definition of mentally retarded.44
Justice Baer wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, joined by Justice McCafferty. 45
Justice Baer agreed with the majority concerning the issues raised pertaining to the guilt phase,
but disagreed with the finding of mental retardation. Justice Baer opined that the third prong was
impossible for Vandivner to satisfy because there was not a structured program at his school to
identify his condition. 46 The dissenters argued Vandivner should not be denied protection under
the Miller rule simply because there were no tests or school records identifying him as mentally
retarded.4 7 Vandivner and those similarly situated to him were prejudiced by the majority's
holding simply because records were not available. 48 Justice Baer noted that Dr. Wright testified
that the only way for a defendant to prove the onset of mental retardation before he was eighteen
was through objective testing, which Vandivner never had access to as a child. 4
The dissenting Justices explained neither Atkins nor Miller required IQ testing to prove
the age of onset, and to require such testing redefines the third prong set forth in Miller.50 Justice
Baer also stated that pursuant to Commonwealth v Rainey, an appellant's burden to prove age
of onset is by a preponderance of evidence.52 Justice Baer argued that Vandivner's expert,
Sedlock, concluded that Vandivner's mental retardation existed prior to age eighteen after
interviewing Vandivner and his family and reviewing his school records. 53
The dissenting Justices opined the case should have been remanded to the trial court to
determine, without an objective standard and considering all evidence provided by Vandivner
and the Commonwealth, whether Vandivner proved mental retardation.54 Justice Baer went on
to suggest that the trial court should analyze the other parts of the Miller test so at the next
appeal, the court would be able to evaluate whether the reliable evidence establishes mental
retardation.5 5

II.

THE HISTORY BEHIND THE VANDIVNER DECISION

Id at 1189.

42

43
44

Id
Id

45.
46

47

Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1190 (Baer, J., dissenting).
Id

Id

48

Id.

49

Id.

5o.

Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1192 (Baer, J., dissenting).
928 A.2d 215, 242 (Pa. 2007).
Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1192 (Baer, J., dissenting).
Idat 1191.
Idat 1192.
Idat 1193.
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In 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Ford v. Wainwright56 that the
Eighth Amendment did not exempt mentally retarded criminals from capital punishment.5 7 The
majority reasoned the purpose of the Eighth Amendment was only to apply to those punishments
considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1789. 5 8
Three years later, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in Penry v. Lynaugh.59 In Penry,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether executing a mentally
retarded defendant with Penry's reasoning ability constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 60 In
Penry, the Court added that the prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment were not limited to those
punishments barred by common law in 1789.61 The protection from cruel and unusual
punishments also extended to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." 62 The majority argued that the most reliable evidence of a consensus would be
the legislation enacted across the country.63 In 1989, Georgia had a statute banning the execution
of mentally retarded defendants found guilty of a capital crime, and Maryland had enacted a
statute which was not yet in effect. 64
The Court, however, stated that these two state statutes barring the execution of mentally
retarded defendants, even when combined with the fourteen states that do not enforce capital
punishment at all, did not provide sufficient evidence of a national consensus. 65 The Court held
that while mental retardation may be considered a mitigating factor for a defendant's culpability
for a capital crime, the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of a mentally retarded
defendant convicted of a capital offense. 66
In light of the deliberations by the American people, legislatures, scholars, and judges
following the Penry decision, in 2002 the Supreme Court decided to reconsider whether the
executions of mentally retarded criminals constituted cruel and unusual punishment in Atkins v.
Virginia.6 7 Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder and sentenced
to death. 68 During the sentencing phase, Atkins presented as an expert witness Dr. Nelson, a
forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins had an IQ of fifty-nine, which rendered him

477 U.S. 399 (1986).
.
Id. Ford was convicted of murder in a 1974 and was sentenced to death. Id at 401. In early
1982, Ford began to show unusual changes in behavior. Id. at 402. Letters to various people suggested a delusion
that he had become a targeted victim of a conspiracy by the Klu Klux Klan and others, which was designed to make
him commit suicide. Id.
58
Id. at 405.
59.
492 U.S. 302 (1989). Penry confessed to beating, raping, and stabbing Pamela Carpenter with a
pair of scissors at her home in Lexington, Texas. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307. He was charged with capital murder. Id.
60.
Id. Penry was sentenced to death in a Texas state court. Id at 302. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Penry, 492 U.S. at 302.
61
Id. at 330 (internal citations omitted).
62
Penry, at 330-31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
63
Id. at 332.
64
Id. at 334.
.

65

Id.

66

Id. at 339.
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
.8
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307. Around midnight on August 16, 1996, Atkins and William Jones, armed
with handguns, abducted the victim and robbed him, took him to an automated teller machine, where cameras
recorded their withdrawal of cash. Id. Atkins and Jones then took the victim to a remote location and shot him eight
times. Id.
67
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"mildly mentally retarded." 69 The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Atkins' contention that he
could not be executed because he was mentally retarded and affirmed the death sentence
imposed by the trial court. 70 In reaching its decision, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on the
holding in Penry.7 1 In considering the changes in the legislative landscape that had occurred
since Penry, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorarito reconsider the issue. 72
Justice Stevens, writing for the six-justice majority, stated that the Court was not
convinced that capital punishment for mentally retarded defendants would promote the deterrent
or the retributive purposes of the death penalty, and thus, such punishment was excessive. 73 The
Court noted that many state legislatures had enacted statutes barring the execution of mentally
retarded defendants after Penry.74 The Court also noted that although some states still allowed
the execution of mentally retarded criminals in 2006, such executions were rare.75 The majority
also found that when Congress passed the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994,76 it included a
provision that exempted mentally retarded defendants from capital punishment.77 Thus, the
Court concluded that there was national consensus against the execution of mentally retarded
defendants.7 8 The Court, however, left to the individual states the task of determining the
standard for what constitutes mental retardation. 79
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, argued that the decision was not supported by the text or history of the Eighth
Amendment, but rather that the majority opinion was based on the personal views of the
members of the Court.
Justice Scalia argued that the Court erroneously concluded that a
national consensus existed.8 ' The dissenting Justices noted that less than half of the states that
impose capital punishment had enacted legislation that barred mentally retarded defendants from
being sentenced to capital punishment. 82
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was called on to address how the Atkins rule should
be applied in Commonwealth v. Miller.83 Miller was convicted of two counts of first degree
murder and sentenced to death. 84 The trial court denied Miller's post-sentence motion, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the death sentences.
Among six mitigating
Id. at 308-09.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.

69

70
71
72

74

.3

Id.
Id.
Id. at 321.

Id.
.5

Atkins 536 U.S. at 321.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598.
77.
Atkins 536 U.S. at 314. This statute provided: "A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a
person who is mentally retarded. A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who, as a result of
mental disability, lacks the mental capacity to understand the death penalty and why it as imposed on that person."
18 U.S.C. at § 3596(c).
78
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
79.
Id. at 317.
so
Id. at 337-38. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
81 Id.
76

82

Id.

.3

888 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2005).
Id.
.
Id. On December 13, 1995, the Governor signed a warrant of execution. Id. at 626. In early
March 1996, the Governor signed a second warrant of execution, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stayed. Id.
The court then appointed counsel to allow Miller to pursue collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act
84
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circumstances the jury found applicable to both murders, two were that Miller had a low mental
intelligence and suffered from mental illness.86 The jury, however, found that two aggravating
circumstances present for each victim outweighed the six mitigating circumstances. 8 7
On August 19, 2002, Miller filed his second petition under the Post Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA), seeking exemption under the holding of Atkins. 89 After reviewing the trial court
record, as well as the record for the first PCRA proceeding, the PCRA court concluded that
Miller had proven, by a preponderance of evidence, that his IQ was, at most, between seventy
and seventy-five, which placed him in the mild mental retardation range.90 The court vacated
Miller's death sentences and ordered consecutive life sentences. 91
The Commonwealth appealed the decision of the PCRA Court. 92 The Commonwealth
contended it must be allowed an opportunity to examine Miller and determine whether he was
mentally retarded and therefore protected under the Atkins rule.93 Miller argued that the
Commonwealth must adopt, at least, either the definition provided by the American Association
of Mental Retardation (AAMR) or the American Psychiatric Association (APA) because those
definitions were used in Atkins. 94 However, Miller contended that states could adopt a more
inclusive standard, such as the definition set forth in the Pennsylvania Health and Mental
Retardation Act. 95
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Cappy noted that both definitions, AAMR and
APA, included three concepts: (1) limited intellectual functioning; (2) significant adaptive
limitations; and (3) age of onset. 96 The majority stated that according to both the AAMR and the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV)'s definitions of mental
retardation, a low IQ score is not alone sufficient to label a person as mentally retarded. 97
Additionally, the defendant must show significant limitations of his or her adaptive behavior. 98
Adaptive behavior refers to the combination of conceptual, social, and practical skills that people
develop in order to function in their daily lives. 99 The Court held that a defendant may prove his

(PCRA), which was denied by the PCRA court. Miller, 888 A.2d at 626. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed
the PCRA courts order. Id.
.6
Id. The other mitigating circumstances were that Miller was the victim of child abuse; was
neglected by his family and society; suffered from psychological trauma caused by neglect; and had alcohol abuse
problems. Id.
.
Id. For one victim, the jury found that Miller had committed a killing while in perpetration of a
felony, and that Miller had a significant history of felony convictions. Id. For the second victim, the jury found that
Miller had been convicted of another murder committed before or at the time of the murder at issue. Miller, 888
A.2d at 626.
88
42 Pa.C.S. §§9541-9546.
89
Id. at 626.
90
Id. at 632.
91
Id. at 625.
92
Id. at 627.
93.
Miller, 888 A.2d at 627.
94.
Id. at 628.
95.
Id. The definition in the statute states "mental retardation means subaverage general intellectual
functioning which originates during the developmental period and is associated with impairment of one or more of
the following: (1) maturation, (2) learning, and (3) social adjustment." 50 P.S. § 4102.
96
Id. at 630.
97.
Id.
98

99

Id.

Id.
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or her mental retardation using either system.100 Also, either party may call qualified experts to
testify to mental retardation under either standard. 101 In light of this, the Court declined to adopt
a cutoff IQ score for determining mental retardation in Pennsylvania.102
Therefore, the majority concluded that the PCRA court abused its discretion in failing to
hold an evidentiary hearing when there was no relevant evidence offered to show Miller was
mentally retarded under the Atkins rule.103 The court remanded the case for further proceedings
in order to give both parties a full and fair opportunity to assert their positions under the court
established standard. 104
In his concurring opinion, Justice Eakin stated that setting standards for determining the
mental retardation of a defendant in a capital case is a legislative matter and that he hoped the
Pennsylvania Legislature would act on this matter without further delay.105
III.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE VANDIVNER DECISION

The Court's holding in Vandivner reaffirms the three-prong test adopted by the Court in
Miller. Regarding Vandivner's first claim, that he met all three parts of the test, the court was
sound in its reasoning that Vandivner had failed to satisfy the third prong. Vandivner had the
burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his mental retardation existed prior to
age eighteen. Vandivner did not produce any evidence of IQ testing, nor did he provide any
school or psychological records to prove mental retardation exited before he reached eighteen
years of age. However, Justice Baer wrote a compelling dissent, which the majority
acknowledged, arguing that the Court had developed an impossible standard for Vandivner and
those similarly situated to satisfy this requirement when no formal testing is available to them. 106
As the majority noted, however, IQ testing is not the sole basis in determining whether a
defendant proves mental retardation by the age of eighteen. Alternative evidence such as school
records can be used to satisfy this requirement. Therefore, while it may be more difficult, the
standard is not impossible for those who do not have access to formal IQ testing.
In its analysis, the majority considered that Vandivner had maintained full-time
employment as a truck driver.107 The majority also logically reasoned that Vandivner missed
ninety-two days of school during his tenth grade year of school, and this may have been the
primary reason for his poor academic performance. The court did not state that objective testing
is required in order to prove age of onset. 08 It simply stated that the trial court did not err in
assessing the evidence presented and noted that the trial court considered school records, which
did not suggest that Vandivner was retarded.109 Considering that Vandivner had the burden to
prove by a preponderance of evidence that his mental retardation existed before he reached age
100
101.

Miller, 888 A.2d at 631.
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 633.
104
Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reaffirmed its decision in Commonwealth v. Crawley,
924 A.2d 612 (Pa. 2007).
10
Miller, 888 A.2d at 633. (Eakin, J., concurring).
1o0.
Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1186.
107.
Id. at 1184. A Pennsylvania Department of Transportation witness testified that Vandivner passed
the requisite license test. In order to pass, test takers must answer correctly eighty percent of the seventy questions.
Id.
108
Id. at 1187.
109
Id.
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eighteen, the trial court, as the majority noted, did not err in reaching the conclusion that
Vandivner did not meet this requirement.
As the majority stated, one purpose of the age of onset requirement is to keep defendants
from feigning mental retardation after they are charged with a capital offense.110 Here, there was
such a concern because Dr. Wright testified that Vandivner gave a poor effort on administered
tests.'11 The dissenting opinion was valid in the argument that Vandivner did not have the
opportunities to prove his mental retardation through objective testing. As Justice Baer noted,
the supervisor of special education for Vandivner's school district testified that, at the time
Vandivner was attending school, there were not formalized evaluation procedures for placing
students in special education class.112 However, the trial court considered school records, which
did not show that he was placed into any special education classes because of mental
retardation.11 3 Also, Justice Baer stated that Vandivner's family members' testimony asserted
that his mental retardation existed before he was eighteen years old.11 4 This part of Justice
Baer's dissent is unpersuasive because the testimony of a defendant's family cannot reasonably
be the basis for concluding that defendant was mentally retarded and therefore exempt from
capital punishment. Such a witness cannot reasonably be expected to make an objective and
credible analysis of her brother's mental condition, knowing that her brother may be put to death
if the court finds that he did not have a certain mental capacity.
Vandivner's second contention, that the trial court erred in refusing to allow testimony of
a mental retardation expert, and thus, the court had no basis for determining whether his adaptive
abilities were similar to those of mildly mentally retarded persons, seems to be without merit.
The court could not disturb the ruling of the trial court unless there was a clear abuse of
discretion.115 As the majority correctly noted, Vandivner could not have been prejudiced by the
trial court's decision not to appoint his requested expert because the determining factor was that
Vandivner failed to prove the onset of mental retardation before he was eighteen years old. The
age of onset requirement is unrelated to adaptive behaviors.116
Regarding the third issue Vandivner raised on appeal, the majority was contradictory in
its rationale. The Supreme Court stated in Atkins that not all defendants claiming to be mentally
retarded fall within the protected class, about whom there is a national consensus against capital
punishment." 7 Here, the Court stated that because there is no national consensus for prohibiting
execution of defendants like Vandivner and those similarly situated, he was not protected under
the Atkins rule. However, the flexibility given by the Supreme Court to the states supports
Vandivner's argument to make exceptions for those defendants of similar ability. The court
chose not to deviate from the three-prong test established in Miller, which was logical. Had the
Court chosen to label Vandivner mentally retarded, the class of protected defendants would
expand very quickly.
Vandivner is a significant decision because it reaffirms that in order to be protected under
the Atkins rule, a defendant must satisfy all three parts of the Miller test. On July 22, 2009,
Vandivner filed a petition for re-argument, arguing that the court erred in holding that case law
1 o.
III
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id.
Id. at 1188.
Id. at 1192. (Baer, J., dissenting).
Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1185.
Id. at 1191. (Baer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1188.
Id. at 1188-89.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
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finding a national consensus against mentally retarded persons did not apply to people who were
mentally deficient to the same extent as mentally retarded persons.
Vandivner also contended
the court's statutory review of the penalty verdict for passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary
factor, overlooked Vandivner's proof of two of three prongs for mental retardation to the trial
court.1 19 The court denied Vandivner's application for re-argument.120
William Grant

1is
119
120
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